Share 2FA recovery codes without leaving them in chat history
Backup codes and account recovery: why not to paste them in Slack or email, and how a one-time link helps.
By Rémy Sainsard
Recovery codes (2FA backup codes) let you sign in when your authenticator app or SMS is unavailable. They are limited-use secrets: once exposed or consumed, you should regenerate them.
Teams still paste them in plain text in a Teams thread, a ticket, or an email “so someone can log in once”. The channel keeps that text long after the incident is over.
Why that is risky
Like a password or an API key, Slack, WhatsApp, and Gmail retain a searchable copy:
- admin access or exports can surface the conversation later;
- a screenshot or thread search can leak codes months later;
- regenerating codes at the provider does not delete the chat message.
An unused recovery code often stays valid until you revoke it — like leaving a spare key under the mat.
Better habit: secret once, link in chat
- Paste the code list (or a single code) on secretshare.eu — encrypted in the browser; the server never sees plaintext.
- Send only the generated link on your usual channel.
- The recipient reads, stores in a password manager, and the link stops working after one view.
- Regenerate remaining codes at the provider if you suspect a leak.
Never paste the codes next to the link in the same message — that puts a permanent copy back in the chat.
Same idea as a self-destructing message: one read, then gone on Secret Share’s side.
Typical use cases
- IT onboarding: hand over backup codes until the authenticator is set up;
- internal support: temporary access to a tool account (with rotation afterward);
- contractor: one-time code instead of a PDF of codes in a project channel.
What Secret Share does not replace
Secret Share delivers the secret; it does not replace 2FA policy (mandatory MFA, team vaults, rotation). For how the product works, see what Secret Share is.
Try it at secretshare.eu.