SecretShare

Share 2FA recovery codes without leaving them in chat history

Backup codes and account recovery: why not to paste them in Slack or email, and how a one-time link helps.

By Rémy Sainsard

Recovery codes (2FA backup codes) let you sign in when your authenticator app or SMS is unavailable. They are limited-use secrets: once exposed or consumed, you should regenerate them.

Teams still paste them in plain text in a Teams thread, a ticket, or an email “so someone can log in once”. The channel keeps that text long after the incident is over.

Why that is risky

Like a password or an API key, Slack, WhatsApp, and Gmail retain a searchable copy:

  • admin access or exports can surface the conversation later;
  • a screenshot or thread search can leak codes months later;
  • regenerating codes at the provider does not delete the chat message.

An unused recovery code often stays valid until you revoke it — like leaving a spare key under the mat.

  1. Paste the code list (or a single code) on secretshare.eu — encrypted in the browser; the server never sees plaintext.
  2. Send only the generated link on your usual channel.
  3. The recipient reads, stores in a password manager, and the link stops working after one view.
  4. Regenerate remaining codes at the provider if you suspect a leak.

Never paste the codes next to the link in the same message — that puts a permanent copy back in the chat.

Same idea as a self-destructing message: one read, then gone on Secret Share’s side.

Typical use cases

  • IT onboarding: hand over backup codes until the authenticator is set up;
  • internal support: temporary access to a tool account (with rotation afterward);
  • contractor: one-time code instead of a PDF of codes in a project channel.

What Secret Share does not replace

Secret Share delivers the secret; it does not replace 2FA policy (mandatory MFA, team vaults, rotation). For how the product works, see what Secret Share is.


Try it at secretshare.eu.